**Appendix A: CFDMC Infectious Disease Surge Annex**

**1. Introduction**

* 1. Purpose:

At any moment, a patient with a highly infectious disease can present at an emergency department. The World Health Organization warns that infectious diseases are emerging at a rate that has never been seen before. High consequence infectious diseases (HCIDs) include hemorrhagic fever viruses (Ebola, Marburg, etc.) and other highly contagious diseases include MERS-CoV, SARS, COVID-19 and other pandemic strains of the influenza virus. Additionally, the potential exists for highly infectious diseases to emerge as a result of deliberate introduction into human, animal, or plant populations for terrorist purposes, such as anthrax, smallpox, and tularemia. The circumstances of infectious disease emergencies may vary by multiple factors, including type of biological agent, scale of exposure, mode of transmission and intentionality (bioterrorism), and many others. Public health measures to contain such outbreaks are especially important for diseases with high morbidity or mortality and limited medical prophylaxis and/or treatment.

Central Florida is uniquely vulnerable to HCIDs or other infectious diseases. The July 2019 US Census estimates 4.5 million people reside in the nine counties representing East Central Florida (Regional Domestic Security Task Force Region 5 or RDSTF-5), and winter residents dramatically increase this population. In addition, domestic and international tourists flock to Central Florida for golf, shopping, water sports, theme parks and conventions. Orlando is the number one most visited destination in the world. Orlando International Airport was the 10th busiest airport in the nation before the pandemic with approximately 50 million passengers each year and rebounded from the pandemic shutdown at twice the average national rate of travelers in December 2020. Visitors also arrive in Central Florida via cruises at Cape Canaveral, Florida’s fastest growing port and the second busiest port in the world, with more than 5 million travelers annually. All of these factors increase the potential for an outbreak in Central Florida.

HCIDs, and other infectious diseases have the potential to significantly impact individual organization's operations, the healthcare system, and the health and safety of personnel and the general public. Many diseases could result in an epidemic and could lead to a pandemic (an epidemic that occurs on a worldwide scale).

The purpose of the Healthcare Coalition Infectious Disease Surge Annex is to guide the Region 5-Central Florida Disaster Medical Coalition in its ability to prepare for, respond to, and manage highly infectious patients that endanger the patients, visitors, staff, and family members of medical healthcare facilities within the region. This plan represents a collaborative regional effort with respect to preparedness for EIDs that pose a significant public health threat to Region 5. The purpose of the plan is to assist Region 5 in containing an outbreak of disease caused by an infectious agent or biological toxin, or response to other EID emergencies as defined in the overview of this plan. The plan identified key information that organizations should know when confronted with a high consequence disease or infectious disease epidemic. It also describes how an organization may be affected, and what measures can be taken to mitigate those effects. In addition to education, this annex provides guidance on preparing and developing a course of action should an outbreak occur.

* 1. Scope:

The scope of this plan is to coordinate the Region 5 response to an infectious disease outbreak. High-consequence infectious diseases (HCIDs) or highly pathogenic respiratory viral infection may pose a public health risk due to the epidemic potential and has the potential to cause a public health emergency for which there are no, or insufficient, countermeasures. Examples include viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHF) (e.g., Ebola, Marburg, Lassa), smallpox, SARS, MERS, and H5N1 influenza A. The plan also addresses the response to a widespread outbreak or pandemic. The plan uses the World Health Organization (WHO) phases associated with pandemic influenza (1 through 6), and the Centers for Disease Control & Prevention (CDC) frontline hospital capabilities to identify, isolate, inform, and prepare for transport a patient suspected of having a highly infectious disease). This plan was designed to assist with public health, medical and emergency preparedness to respond to an occurrence, or threat of an occurrence, of pandemic influenza or an HCID and is not intended to apply to more routine infectious diseases (such as tuberculosis).

This plan applies to all Coalition member organizations, when an event occurs that is beyond the individual health care organization’s ability to manage the response. This plan does not supersede or conflict with applicable laws and statutes and is intended to supplement the state and local emergency operations plans with information specific to an infectious disease.

This plan describes the actions the CFDMC, and its member organizations will follow to prepare and respond to an infectious disease outbreak.

1.3 Overview/Background of HCC and Situation

The CFDMC Infectious Disease Surge Annex (IDSA) was developed by the Central Florida Emerging Infectious Disease (EID) Collaborative workgroup. This plan will be reviewed and updated in May of each year by the CFDMC. Lessons learned as they emerge from After Action Report/ Improvement Plans following real events or planned training exercises will be incorporated into the IDSA.

The CFDMC healthcare delivery system within RDSTF Region 5, comprised of Brevard, Indian River, Lake, Martin, Orange, Osceola, Seminole, St. Lucie and Volusia Counties, is a network of facilities and persons who carry out the tasks of ensuring that healthcare services are available and providing healthcare services to the public. This includes the Coalition, hospitals and health systems, emergency management, public health, EMS providers, long-term care providers, behavioral and mental health providers, specialty service providers (dialysis, pediatrics, urgent care, district Medical Examiners, funeral directors, etc.), support service providers (laboratories, pharmacies, blood banks, poison control, etc.), primary care providers, community health providers, and other healthcare and response stakeholders. There are 45 acute care hospitals and 14 stand-alone emergency departments in Region 5.

The CFDMC Emerging Infectious Disease Collaborative was established in 2015 to coordinate and standardize preparedness and response to high consequence infectious diseases such as Ebola. The EID Collaborative is comprised of infectious disease subject matter experts such as hospital epidemiologists, healthcare acquired infection (HAI) professionals, hospital emergency preparedness staff, and representatives from public health, emergency management, emergency medical services, and nursing homes. The Collaborative converged on PPE, and minimum standards for PPE for this type of event have been established and equipment has been purchased and distributed by the Coalition. The EID Collaborative had begun to converge on protocols, but this work has been disrupted by the COVID19 pandemic. The EID Collaborative has now expanded the infectious disease annex to include all highly infectious diseases and to address response to a pandemic.

1.4 Description and Cause:

Influenza is a highly infectious viral illness. The name “influenza” originated in 15th century Italy from an epidemic attributed to “influence of the stars.” The first pandemic or world-wide epidemic that clearly fits the description of influenza was in 1580. At least four (4) pandemics of influenza occurred in the 19th century and four (4) occurred in the 20th century. The pandemic of “Spanish flu” in 1918–1919 caused an estimated 21 million deaths worldwide. The pandemic of “Covid-19” is ongoing.

There are three ‘types’ of influenza viruses that cause disease in humans: A, B, and C.

* Influenza A usually causes pandemics with moderate to severe illness, affecting all age groups.
* Influenza B generally causes milder disease than type A, and affects only humans, primarily children.
* Influenza C is rarely reported as a cause of human illness.

The nomenclature to describe the type of influenza virus is expressed in this order:

• Virus type

• Geographic site where it was first isolated

• Strain number

• Year of isolation

• Virus subtype

A high consequence infectious disease (HCID) is defined as:

* it is an acute infectious disease
* it typically has a high-case fatality rate
* it may not have effective prophylaxis or treatment
* it is often difficult to recognize and detect rapidly
* it has the ability to spread in the community and within healthcare settings

1.5 Assumptions:

This plan takes an all-hazards approach to infectious diseases, while using standard state and local planning scenarios for Central Florida. This plan is based on the following general assumptions:

For high consequence infectious diseases:

* A HCID (confirmed or suspected) patient has presented to a health care facility or the EMS within Florida Region 5 and has impacted operations up to and including the need for a facility to evacuate or the World Health Organization has declared a pandemic, or the State of Florida has issued an Executive Order declaring a public health emergency.
* Impacted facilities have activated their emergency operations plan and staffing of their facility operations center.
* Local resources will be used first, and then State resources, followed by a Federal request as needed.
* The increased number of area residents and staff needing medical help may burden and/or overcome the health and medical infrastructure. This increase in demand may require a regional response and/or subsequent city, county, state, and/or federal level of assistance.
* Facilities will communicate their medical needs through ESF -8 protocols and non-medical needs to the jurisdictional emergency operations center.
* Healthcare organizations will report status on situational awareness but will manage the incident on their own as much as possible before requesting assistance.
* The IDSA integrates the key elements of communicable disease control and prevention with emergency management concepts. A National Incident Management System (NIMS) compliant Incident Command System (ICS) organizational structure will be utilized to scale the response as needed to effectively manage and meet the incident objectives for the infectious disease emergency response.

Region 5 Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF) members and partners are trained and knowledgeable regarding the implementation and execution of this plan.

* The regional resources will work in full cooperation with the appropriate Emergency Management Offices and Hospital Incident System-Command Teams in a Unified Command effort.

All Florida Region 5 hospitals have emergency plans which address EID.

* Processes and procedures outlined in this response plan are designed to support and not supplant individual healthcare organization emergency response efforts.
* Full cooperation, collaboration, communication and coordination between the Regions’ hospitals and the City and County Emergency Management Offices must be established in order to maximize the effectiveness of this plan.

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services assumptions about pandemic disease along with real world experience and the CFDMC After Action report following Covid-19 pandemic forged the following assumptions:

* Susceptibility to the pandemic influenza will be universal.
* The clinical disease attack rate will be 30 percent in the overall population. Illness rates will be highest among school-aged children (about 40 percent) and the elderly. Among working adults, an average of 20 percent could become ill during a community outbreak.
* Risk groups for severe and fatal infections cannot be predicted with certainty. During annual fall and winter influenza season, infants and the elderly, persons with chronic illness, and pregnant women are usually at higher risk of complications from influenza infections.
* The typical incubation period for influenza averages two to three days. COVID-19 demonstrated a fourteen-day incubation period for a novel strain transmitted between people by respiratory secretions.
* Persons who become ill may shed virus and can transmit infection for several days before the onset of illness. Viral shedding and the risk for transmission may be greatest during the first two days of illness.
* In an affected community, an outbreak will typically last about six to eight weeks. At least two pandemic disease waves are likely. Following the pandemic, the new viral subtype is likely to continue circulating and contribute to seasonal influenza.
* The seasonality of a pandemic cannot be predicted with certainty. The largest waves in the United States during 20th-century pandemics occurred in fall and winter.

1.6 Goals & Objectives:

The goals of the IDSA are:

* To define key planning assumptions
* To outline the role and responsibilities of CFDMC
* To define concept of operations during a pandemic influenza outbreak
* To list the actions undertaken by CFDMC to prepare
* To improve our community’s and our partner agencies preparedness for a pandemic.

Planning will help to reduce transmission of the pandemic virus strain, to decrease cases, hospitalizations and deaths, to maintain essential services and to reduce the economic and social impact of a pandemic. The objectives of the IDSA are to:

* Assist all agencies that make up the coalition with preparing for and responding to a pandemic
* Standardize plans and protocols
* Provide training and equipment to healthcare partners to prepare for response
* Share best practices across the region

**2. Concept of Operations**

2.1 Triggers/Activation:

This plan will be activated upon rapid identification and communication to the local health department of a potential HCID patient at the first point of contact in any healthcare setting in Central Florida Region 5. This plan can be initiated by any of the region’s hospitals, health clinics and offices, local health departments, emergency medical services, or County Emergency Operations Centers when potential HCID patient are suspected through laboratory diagnostics or consultation with Region 5 Health and Medical Co-Chairs.

WHO Phase Change Alert: notification of any WHO phase change will be received through national and international channels. When a phase change notification is received, the Department of Health will communicate to internal and external partners through established alerting protocols.

Based on alert and notification of a WHO phase change and/or validated surveillance system aberration, the appropriate components of this plan will be activated. CFDMC will mirror the activation levels of the State Emergency Operations Center.

Based on the course of the pandemic and the reduction of illness within the state, the response efforts will be scaled down in an appropriate and proportionate way. Surveillance systems will be monitored on a regular basis to determine pandemic influenza activity in the state and to identify further areas for investigation and confirmation of disease.

2.2 Notifications:

Healthcare facilities will report patients under investigation (PUI) for an HCID to the local health department (LHD). The LHD will then contact the State Health Department. When appropriate, the state epidemiologist contacts the Bureau of Preparedness and Response to initiate transport of patient to the regional treatment center. By state policy, the State Surgeon General (or their designee), the State ESF 8 Emergency Coordinating Officer, or the State Epidemiologist shall authorize patient transport to the regional treatment center.

Pandemics are typically declared by the World Health Organization and in Florida are issued as public health executive orders issued by the Florida State Surgeon General.

2.3 Operational Mission Areas

2.3.1 Command and Coordination: ICS is a management system that is used to achieve optimal command and control within an organization as well as seamless inter-agency coordination during any type of emergency. It uses a clearly defined chain of command with a limited span of control

* State Role: The Florida Department of Health (FDOH) State Surgeon General is responsible for the overall direction, management and control of all Department personnel and resources committed to control of an influenza pandemic. Once the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) is activated this plan is incorporated into the established state emergency management structure.
* Regional Role : The State and local ICS structure will expand and contract as the pandemic situation warrants. If an area command or multi-agency coordination system (MAC) is used, it will follow Regional Domestic Security Taskforce (RDSTF) geographical boundaries.
* Local Role: The Health and Medical Emergency Support System (ESF - 8) will coordinate and manage the response to an influenza pandemic will utilize the incident command system (ICS).
* The overarching goal is to assist Emergency Management and Emergency Support Function 8 (ESF-8) with the National Preparedness Goals mission areas: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery as it relates to healthcare disaster operations.
* WEB-EOC: Emergency Management utilizes WebEOC for event management mission requests and supplies. The Coalition monitors this for all disasters and shares relevant information. Informational posts are monitored, and relevant information is forwarded or included in the daily situation report. County situation reports are reviewed for situational awareness. Each county’s mission requests submitted through WebEOC is reviewed to determine if local resources from within the coalition can meet the need. If a resource requested is readily available locally through the Coalition or other member organizations, the coalition will notify the State ESF8 desk and the local requestor of the available local resources. If so directed by the State ESF8 desk, the coalition will put the requesting organization in touch with the organization providing the resource to arrange transfer of the resource.

2.3.2 Initial Outbreak:

In an HCID, the initial outbreak focuses on the frontline hospital’s capability to identify, isolate and inform. The EID Collaborative has established a standardized screening protocol for Ebola, which can be adapted to any HCID (see Attachment 1). Most hospitals within the region have undergone a frontline hospital assessment and have identified areas for isolation. Hospitals are required to report an HCID to the local health department.

In a pandemic, the Initial Outbreak encompasses WHO Phases 3, 4, 5 and early 6. The main objectives for the Initial Outbreak period are testing, contact tracing, and public information on mitigation measures.

2.3.3 Response Phase:

The response phase activities in an HCID focus on the frontline hospital’s capability to stabilize and prepare the patient for transport. Standardized protocols for donning and doffing have been developed and CFMC has purchased and distributed PPE (hoods and gowns). Standardized protocols for managing an HCID patient until transport to a regional treatment facility is underway have also been developed (see Attachment 6 - HCID Isolation Guide). Transport is through the Florida Infectious Disease Transportation Network.

The response phase activities in a widespread epidemic or pandemic focus on community control measures, including isolation of symptomatic cases, quarantine of suspected cases, wide-spread infection control procedures and mitigation efforts and public information and education. Hospitals will focus on increase surge capacity to ensure appropriate treatment for the ill, managing staffing and equipment shortages, activating alternate care sites and managing large numbers of fatalities. Additional activities will include preparing for and conducting large-scale vaccination campaigns when a vaccine becomes available, and continuation of surveillance and tracking activities.

2.3.4 Surveillance:

The Florida Department of Health (FDOH) has the lead responsibility for disease surveillance. The FDOH Bureau of Epidemiology conducts disease surveillance and investigates suspected occurrences of infectious diseases and conditions that are reported from physician’s offices, hospitals, laboratories and other medical providers and community partners. Surveillance is primarily conducted through passive reporting from the medical community as required by Chapter 381.0031 (1,2), Florida Statutes. Data is collected and examined to determine the existence of trends. Syndromic surveillance was added to the disease reporting process as an active method of determining activities in the community that could be early indicators of outbreaks and bio- terrorism.

2.3.5 Community-based Testing

The Florida Department of Health has the lead responsibility for disease surveillance with its Department of Epidemiology. The Epidemiology Department conducts disease surveillance and investigates suspected occurrences of infectious diseases and conditions that are reported from physician’s offices, hospitals, laboratories and other medical providers and community partners.

Surveillance is primarily conducted through passive reporting from the medical community as required by Chapter 381.0031 (1,2), Florida Statutes.

Data is collected and examined to determine the existence of trends. We conduct syndromic and influenza-like surveillance activities. Syndromic surveillance was added to the disease reporting process as an active method of determining activities in the community that could be early indicators of outbreaks and bio- terrorism.

Case investigation, contact tracing, confinement and quarantine are the responsibilities of the department of Health.

The data relied upon during a pandemic is managed by three state agencies, Emergency Management Department of Health and Agency for Health Care Administration.

The department of Health oversees the Merlin disease reporting system. This includes case volume, positivity rate, case outcomes and other public health data. Regional reports and numbers are pulled by the coalition from the state dashboards and shared.

2.3.6 Data Reporting:

The data relied upon during a pandemic is managed and reported by three state agencies, Division Emergency Management (DEM), FDOH, and the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA).

FDOH oversees the Merlin disease reporting system. This includes case volume, positivity rate, case outcomes and other public health data. Regional reports and numbers are pulled by CFDMC from the state dashboards and shared with regional partners.

AHCA oversees the ESS bed reporting system. This provides data on census, ICU capacity, ventilator usage and more. CFDMC extracts regional data sets and shares this with its partners.

DEM utilizes WebEOC for event management mission requests and supplies. CFDMC monitors mission requests to the state.

2.3.7 Safety and Infection Control and Prevention:

Immediate isolation of potential HCID patient(s) wherever presented is needed to protect other patients, healthcare workers, and the general population until transportation to the nearest treatment facility is possible. In most HCID events, patients will likely be placed in isolation to prevent transmission of the infection to others. Isolation facilities will inevitably vary between healthcare entities.

All Central Florida Region 5 healthcare facilities have established training in isolation procedures and infection control to enable them to safely place a patient in isolation. The length of isolation time that will be required will vary based on the disease, patient condition and symptomology, and the status of the Florida Infectious Disease Transportation Network (FIDTN), but all facilities need to be prepared to isolate a patient until transferred to a more capable facility. All Region 5 healthcare facilities should follow the SOPs and plans for each respective healthcare facility to ensure effective identification, isolation and communication of a potential HCID patient.

In a pandemic, CDC provides guidance on safety and infection control and prevention measures which are updated as the pandemic unfolds.

2.3.8 Worker Safety

Healthcare facilities must have procedures in place to be able to monitor staff for signs and symptoms of infection after they have provided care or potentially had exposure to an HCID or other infectious disease patient.

Hospitals should have procedures to address the needs of staff and incentivize their participation in providing care to an HCID patient. Incentives may include recognition through clothing, challenge coins and pay incentive. Staff may need non-congregate housing if they are exposed or assistance with childcare.

CFDMC includes self-care information in each situation report and is currently working with a vendor on a responder resiliency training for healthcare and emergency response personnel.

2.3.9 Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions

Even with the current technologies, it will take several months or more before vaccines based on a new influenza strain can be produced on a large scale. Prior to vaccine availability all agencies in the coalition should help promote the recommended CDC guidelines. During the COVID19 pandemic, these included:

* Clean your hands often - Wash your hands often with soap and water for at least 20 seconds or use alcohol-based hand rub especially after you have been in a public place, or after blowing your nose, coughing, or sneezing.
* Avoid close contact - Stay at least 6 feet (about 2 arms’ length) from other people.
* Wear a well-fitting mask - Cover your mouth and nose with a cloth face cover (i.e. at least 2-ply cloth material that you cannot see through) when around others.
* Clean AND disinfect frequently touched surfaces daily. This includes tables, doorknobs, light switches, countertops, handles, desks, phones, keyboards, toilets, faucets, and sinks.

Additional measures were needed to protect vulnerable populations. For example, early in the pandemic, hospitals and nursing homes restricted visitation. It is noted that this isolation has generate behavioral health issues. CFDMC has secured Mental Health First Aid training for its members and has also identified 16 individuals within the region for a MFHA train-the-trainer program.

2.3.10 Surge Staffing

A high prevalence of morbidity, mortality, and the worried well may lead to an increase in public demand for health services (e.g., hospitals, clinics, local health departments). Hospitals anticipating or experiencing health care demands that exceed their daily operating capabilities should activate hospital surge plans utilizing their emergency operating procedures and request assistance via the hospital incident command system (HICS) to county emergency management.

In the event of a 30% reduced workforce either due to an emergency requiring large numbers of responders or widespread illness or other reasons, and individual agencies exhausting individual, agency specific continuity of operations plan, the Health Department and/or county Emergency Management Offices will initiate the continuity of operations plans to assist with the provision of critical services.

2.3.11 Alternate Care Sites

Alternate care sites may be identified by local emergency management, public health, or hospitals and may be used for testing, vaccinations, hospital ED triage, and treatment. Each county has an alternate care site plan and there is a regional ACS cache available upon request. During the initial surge in 2020, the Coalition deployed tents to support a hospital system for triage and testing.

2.3.12 Supply Chain, Supplies, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE):

The CFDMC EID Collaborative has converged on PPE for an HCID, and these are included on the CFDMC Minimum Hospital Equipment List (see Attachment 2). The EID Collaborative also converged on donning/doffing protocols for an HCID (see Attachment 3). An online training video was planned but delayed due to the pandemic.

2.3.13 Medical Countermeasures

* Antivirals: Limited amounts of antiviral will be available for treatment and prophylaxis of a novel virus in a pandemic. State stockpiles will be available to priority groups for treatment and prophylaxis according to federal guidelines from the HHS. Treatment, containment, control and prevention strategies for pandemic influenza are most effective when antivirals for treatment and pre- and post-exposure prophylaxis are included with other non-pharmaceutical interventions.
* Convalescent plasma treatments: Plasma is the liquid part of blood. Convalescent plasma means **plasma that comes from people who have recovered from an infection**, like the coronavirus that causes COVID-19. This plasma may contain antibodies against the virus.
* Vaccines: When the pandemic occurs, vaccine will not be available or will be in short supply and will be allocated on a priority basis following federal guidelines from the Department of Health and Human Services. Vaccine will be available for pandemic influenza prophylaxis approximately six to eight months after the pandemic begins. The total vaccine supply will be under the control of the federal government. With the emergence of a novel influenza virus strain, all persons identified for vaccination will likely need two doses of vaccine to achieve optimal antibody response.

2.3.14 Patient Transport

* The current state of EID disaster response for the State of Florida is a redundant transportation system that includes a plan to transport a patient with a highly infectious pathogen by air to a regional treatment center. If air transportation is not available, a ground transportation network has been developed that transports a patient across Florida to our nearest regional treatment center (Emory). The Florida Infectious Disease Transportation Network (FIDTN) has been exercised regionally and found to be a robust state-wide response capability, although capacity is very limited.
* The primary means of transportation of an EID patient will occur through the activation of the FIDTN. Transportation needs will be coordinated with the assistance of the emergency operations (ESF 8 representative) as required.
* Intra-facility transport procedures. As part of the CDC frontline hospital criteria, each hospital is to map patient transport routes specific to the layout of their campus. Hospitals are to have transport routes that utilized less populated routes and or outdoor routes for transporting patients. Alternatively, hospitals are to have plans in place to be able to care for the patient in the emergency department.
* Prioritization, transfer locations and the movement of patients to other facilities or specialty transfers is done in accordance with the state of Florida patient movement plan. State ESF8 is prepared to coordinate resources to support the movement of persons with medical and functional needs in impacted areas where local health and medical systems are overwhelmed. RegionalPatientCoordinatorshavebeenidentifiedineachregiontoassistin coordinating patient placement.
* In all events, the coalition shares ESS data on bed availability with regional and county emergency management leads and assists hospitals in locating appropriate beds as requested.
* As part of the regional trauma resource coordination plan, the region will be piloting a regional multi-organization coordination center (MOCC). If successful, the MOCC will be expanded to infectious disease outbreaks.

2.3.15 Fatality Management:

There are Five medical examiner offices in the region. Despite earlier planning to the contrary, it is possible that all pandemic victims will be ME cases. Early in the COVID19 pandemic, hospitals and funeral homes were alerted that all COVID19 deaths fall under ME jurisdiction. The coalition has a regional mass fatality plan and the MEs are working mutual aid agreements. There is limited morgue capacity at hospitals and the ME offices and local ESF8 assisted in identifying emergency storage capacity. In addition, the state FEMORS team was on standby along with the National Guard to provide transportation to storage areas. There is a state death registration system, and the coalition will help to get messaging out for that system.

2.3.16 Support Services. These include:

**Environmental Services (EVS):**

* Each facility followed its own protocols during the pandemic, using guidance from CFC.
* In an HCID, the regional protocol is that nursing and other clinical staff will perform daily cleaning tasks. EVS will perform terminal cleaning and be the last person out of the room. EVS will assist the last healthcare worker out of PPE. An EVS buddy will be in Level 1 PE in the anteroom to assist the last EVS worker out of the room upon completion of terminal cleaning. EVS staff are to clear chemical PAPs to protect from bleach fumes.

**Laboratory:**

* CDC recommends that Ebola testing be conducted only for persons who meet the criteria for persons under investigation (PUIs) for EVD. A PUI is a person who has both consistent signs and/or symptoms, including elevated body temperature or subjective fever or symptoms, including severe headache, fatigue, muscle pain, vomiting, diarrhea, abdominal pain, or unexplained hemorrhage, AND an epidemiological risk factor within the 21 days preceding the onset of symptoms.
* It is recommended that hospitals perform point of care testing for HCIDs when possible. The coalition purchased point of care (POC) lab testing equipment for eight hospitals who underwent a CDC Assessment Hospital site visit (See Attachment 5 - Laboratory POC Testing for Ebola)
* In the pandemic, testing was performed as prescribed under Executive Order, based on guidance from CDC. All test results were mandated to be reported to FDOH within 24 hours.

**Waste Management, Decontamination**: All waste from an HCID will be put in barrels for off-site transport and disposal. For novel pathogens, guidance from CDC and or OSHA will be followed. Standard waste disposal procedures are sufficient for disposing of personal protective equipment and other items contaminated with SARS Cov-2/COVID-19 in regular trash.

**Behavioral Health:** Disaster Behavioral Health responders work with survivors, families, responders and the community to assist with the mitigation of emotional, psychological, and physical effects of a disaster, natural or man-made. Disaster behavioral health responders apply the concepts of psychological first aid to help those affected overcome the initial impact of shock, denial, and depression when confronting disasters. The impact of a pandemic or an HCID on responders cannot be over-estimated.

The region has a behavioral health response plan which includes a behavioral health liaison available to each county or regional ESF8 and uses the Florida Crisis Response Team and other behavioral health response assets to provide services to survivors, families and responders. To support responders during the pandemic, the Coalition is providing Mental Health First Aid training to members and is providing a MFHA train-the-trainer course for 16 individuals so that we can sustain this training in the future. We are also working with the Miami University DEEP Center to provide additional responder self-care and resiliency resources to the region’s healthcare and emergency responders.

2.3.18 At-Risk Populations: Risk groups for severe and fatal infections cannot be predicted with certainty. During annual fall and winter influenza season, infants and the elderly, persons with chronic illness, and pregnant women are usually at higher risk of complications from influenza infections. The region follows CDC guidelines in identifying and protecting at-risk populations.

2.3.19 Communications: Communication strategies are an important component in managing any infectious disease outbreak and are essential in the event of a pandemic. There will be an immediate and continuous demand from all segments of society for information on the actual and potential impact, magnitude, transmission, treatment, and recovery resulting from the pandemic. Information demands during a pandemic will be sustained over a long period and maintaining public confidence over many months will be based on consistency and credibility of messages. Accurate and timely information at all levels is critical in order to minimize unwanted and unforeseen social disruption and economic consequences and to maximize the effective outcome of the response. Public communications remain the responsibility of the local jurisdiction and individual agency or organization and may be coordinated through the state emergency management system. Joint information centers will be established in each county to ensure consistent communications.

Upon notification of an HCID presenting at a healthcare facility in Central Florida Region 5 by the hospital or local health department, the CFDMC will provide situational awareness to all HCC members through conference calls and email updates.

The Coalition has redundant communication capabilities with its members, including more than two thousand individuals representing almost 700 organizations. During blue skies, the Coalition uses Constant Contact to share information on meetings, plans, trainings and exercises with its members. During exercises and gray skies, the Coalition uses the Everbridge health alert network to share information with members. In an event, members receive a wealth of information from multiple mechanisms, including the news media and local emergency management. The Coalition’s role in information sharing is to monitor communications from local and State ESF8 and share information with member organizations that is not provided via other partners, such as regional status.

The Coalition is beginning an 18 month pilot in partnership with Florida Health Association to test the CORVENA system as a communication platform for exercises and events.

2.5 Roles and Responsibilities

2.5.1 Central Florida Disaster Medical Coalition (CFDMC) primary role and responsibilities in an infectious disease event are facilitating situational awareness and resource coordination.

* CFDMC facilitates information sharing among participating health care organizations and with jurisdictional authorities to promote common situational awareness. Information is sought across multiple disciplines through various methods and is shared with partner agencies via posting on the coalition website and through emails and situation reports. During the COVID19 pandemic, CFDMC has produced a daily situation report for members including federal and state orders, rules and guidance, a regional overview on total cases, hospitalizations, deaths, and vaccines administered, and information shared during webinars and conference calls.
* CFDMC provides resource coordination and support at a regional level. Resource requests are made from the member organization in need to the local county emergency management/ESF8. If the county cannot meet the need, the mission request is forwarded to the State EOC/ESF8. CFDMC monitors mission requests daily and if a resource is available within the region, contacts the State and local county to offer the resource. Through the Emerging Infectious Disease Collaborative, CFDMC also facilitates the coordination of EID incident response actions for participating healthcare organizations so incident objectives, strategies and tactics are consistent for the healthcare response.

2.5.2: Hospitals: Hospitals are responsible for acute health care service provision. In addition to providing medical care, during an HCID or pandemic hospitals will:

* Make beds and surge spaces rapidly available for initial triage and stabilization, and obtain additional staff, equipment, and supplies
* Ensure immediate bed availability (IBA) by rapidly prioritizing patients for discharge, maximizing the use of staffed beds, and using non-traditional spaces (e.g., observation areas)
* Establish virtual visitations and hotlines
* Rapidly expand capacity (for those facilities that provide it) by adapting procedural, pre- and post-operative, and other areas for critical care and assess staff, equipment, and supply needs for these spaces to facilitate requests
* Call back clinical and non-clinical staff; utilize staff in non-traditional roles. Adjust staffing ratios and shifts as required
* Implement emergency equipment, supplies and stocking strategies, and resource sharing agreements
* Implement PPE sustainment practices
* Rapidly isolate patients
* Provide personal protective equipment (PPE) and prophylaxis to their employees and visitors while awaiting either comprehensive evaluation, definitive diagnosis, or transfer
* Utilize tertiary care facilities, when possible, or designated facilities to assess, manage, and treat patients with suspected highly pathogenic transmissible infections (e.g., severe acute respiratory syndrome [SARS]/Middle East respiratory syndrome [MERS]) or non-transmissible infections (e.g., anthrax)
* Define and implement visitor policies for infectious disease emergencies, in collaboration with the HCC, to ensure uniformity.

The region has standardized a staffing model for an HCID such as Ebola (see Attachment 4). During an HCID, clinical management includes:

* Initial screening and triage protocol will be a syndromic based screening tool. Please see Attachment 1 for the Ebola screening tool.
* Treatment of symptoms will be per facility policy.

2.5.3 EMS: EMS agencies provides emergency medical services outside of a hospital setting. During an HCID or pandemic EMS will also:

* Use Vital Alerts to notify the emergency departments of an incoming potential COVID-19 patient.
* Coordinate patient distribution for highly pathogenic respiratory viruses and other highly transmissible infections when tertiary care facilities or designated facilities are not available
* Recognized early on the need to distribute PPE to all LTC’s, public safety, hospitals and other first line workers
* Implement PPE sustainment practices
* Provide education and training to area partners
* Set up and manage testing sites
* Provide support to hospitals and alternative care sites

2.5.4 Emergency Management: The primary role of emergency management is to “protect and preserve the safety” of the jurisdiction’s citizenry. The emergency manager must develop relationships with emergency response agencies to facilitate inter-agency operations in emergencies. Inter-agency competition must dissolve into a seamless emergency response when needed, but the emergency manager must also be aware of the limits of each department. Emergency management coordinates emergency response efforts. During the pandemic, the Governor designated the Florida Division of Emergency Management (FDEM) as the lead agency for the event. FDEM and the county emergency management offices worked closely with FDOH and the local health departments to set up and operate testing sites and vaccination sites.

2.5.5 Public Health: In an HCID or pandemic, public health plays a key role as the subject matter experts. During the pandemic, public health has worked with emergency management to provide testing and vaccinations. In addition, public health is responsible for surveillance, data collection and reporting, contact tracing, and other mitigation efforts.

2.5.6 Medical Examiners

Medical Examiner (ME) Offices provide death cause investigations. Unexpectedly, all COVID deaths fell under the ME jurisdiction. All prior education and training were that Medical Examiners would not handle all deaths, just those at home. This required messaging to alert hospitals and funeral homes that all COVID deaths fall under the ME jurisdiction. Guidance on handling bodies was provided through links to CDC and national funeral association guidance on body handling and preparation. MEs were not required to perform an autopsy on each case, and bodies were kept at hospitals until the family could choose a funeral home.

Issues that need additional protocol development include:

* Protocols for safe handling of corpses, respecting cultural and religious beliefs. Death reporting.
* During the pandemic, medical examiners reported death based on the county where the death occurred; the health department reported based on county of residence.
* Medical Examiners information on deaths is public information and for DOH it is protected information.
* The region needs to identify collection points in each county to relieve the strain on hospitals who have limited morgue capacity.
* The region has identified the need to expand cremation capacity.

2.5.7 Long-Term Care Facilities

Nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and other long-term care agencies provide non acute care and may help to alleviate hospital congestion. There is a necessity for speed, flexibility and adaptability in carrying out the provision of care with needed supplies and while maintaining a business. In order to protect their vulnerable populations during an HCID or pandemic, these agencies will:

* Restrict visitations in accordance with regulatory guidance and requirements
* Enhance PPE and hygiene practices
* Perform resident and staff testing

The Coalition is working with nursing homes to improve infection control practices and provide PPE.

2.6 Training and Exercises

The EID Collaborative has identified the following minimum training requirements for hospitals:

* Practice donning and doffing PPE a minimum of twice per year
* Perform clinical skills check while wearing PPE a minimum of twice per year (I.e., start IV, insert catheters, etc.)
* Participate in EID drill, tabletop, or functional based on organizational need
* Drill patient movement within facility at least annually unless incorporated functional exercise
* Ensure patient care teams are trained based on type of patients seen (I.e., OB, PEDS, etc.)

To maintain the necessary skills and knowledge to appropriately respond to an EID emergency, CFDMC will provide ongoing training and exercise opportunities for CFDMC community partners. These include, but are not limited to:

* Communication drills
* Ongoing ICS and NIMS training
* IDSA trainings, drills, and exercises
* CFDMC and hospital/healthcare led EID workshops, drills and exercises

2.7 Deactivation and Recovery

After an infectious disease outbreak is over, it can be expected that many people will be affected in a variety of ways. Many may have lost friends or relatives, suffer from fatigue or have financial losses as a result of the interruption of businesses and employment. CFDMC is planning trainings and services to help address these issues. Governments or other authorities should ensure that these concerns can be addressed and support the rebuilding of the society. If needed, organize training and education for personnel involved will be provided.

The Coalition will facilitate a regional after action report and work with healthcare and emergency response partners to address improvement opportunities and test these improvements in future exercises.

**3. CFDMC Emerging Infectious Disease Collaborative**

The EID Collaborative was formed in 2014 in response to the Ebola outbreak that threatened the United States. Since that time the EID Collaborative has led the region’s efforts in preparing for an HCID or pandemic. The EID Collaborative is led by Dr. Vincent Hsu, CFDMC Board Member and Hospital Epidemiologist and Executive Director for Infection Prevention at AdventHealth Orlando. He also serves as an Assistant Director for the AdventHealth Internal Medicine Residency Program with faculty appointments from the Colleges of Medicine at Florida State University and the University of Central Florida. The EID Collaborative is comprised of representatives from the region’s acute care hospitals, including epidemiologist and healthcare acquired infection (HAI) professionals, public health, EMS, and EM/ESF8. This plan is the results of countless hours in planning by these members:

|  |
| --- |
| A. C. Burke |
| Alex Masmela |
| Amanda Freeman |
| Amy Johnson |
| Andrea Gibson |
| April Chilson |
| April Hultz |
| Beverly Nieves |
| Brandy Hershberger |
| Brenna Young |
| Brent Price |
| Brian Connor |
| Bryan Margeson |
| Carmelo Maldonado |
| Carole Brown |
| Chris Fender |
| Craig Bair |
| Cynthia Posey |
| David Crowe |
| Debra Johnson |
| Donna Shaw |
| Dr. Antonio Crespo |
| Eddie Brooks |
| Edwin Loftin |
| Eric Alberts |
| Eve Early |
| George Wood |
| Greg Garren |
| Greg Pereira |
| Gregory Donohue |
| Heather Crary |
| James Witherspoon |
| Janet Livingston |
| Jason Klein |
| Jayne Willis |
| Jeni Szmidt |
| Jennifer Puglisi |
| Jeri Hendershot |
| Jo Alverson |
| John Corfield |
| John Lazarus |
| John Maze |
| John Voight |
| Juliana Carter |
| Julie Urian |
| Karen McKenzie |
| Kathy Johnston |
| Keila Walker |
| Kelley Jenkins |
| Kenneth Albert |
| Kevin McGuinness |
| Kim Quinn |
| Kimberly Cribb |
| Leighann Kelly |
| Leona Demps |
| Lindsay Martin |
| Luis Mende |
| Lynne Drawdy |
| Lynsey Collier Graham |
| Maggie Deangelo |
| Martha Santoni |
| Matt Meyers |
| Matthew Winter |
| Melissa Royer |
| Melyssa Callahan |
| Michael Poniatowski |
| Michael Schuffert |
| Michael Singletary |
| Michelle Radaszewski |
| Michelle Rud |
| Michelle Strenth |
| Miranda Hunt |
| Moammed Ahmed |
| Nathan Wilson |
| Nicole Crocker |
| Nicole Johnson |
| Pamela Reed |
| Paul Johns |
| Phil Andrews |
| Rachel Driscoll |
| Ralph Miro |
| Rebeca Wilson |
| Rebecca Hale |
| Reginald Kornegay |
| Richard Brown |
| Robert Love |
| Rodney Archebelle |
| Scot Metcalf |
| Sean Austin |
| Shane Friedman |
| Sharon Kent |
| Stacy King |
| Stephen Viel |
| Steven Viola |
| Theresa Caldwell |
| Thomas Schoenle |
| Todd Stalbaum |
| Tommy Curtis |
| Tony Echazabal |
| Tonya Lyles |
| Vincent Hsu |
| Wayne Struble |
| Wendy Kimmelman |

**4. Attachments**

Attachment 1 - HCID Standardized Screening Protocol

Attachment 2 - Region 5 Minimum Hospital Equipment List

Attachment 3 - HCID Donning/Doffing Protocol

Attachment 4: HCID Staffing Model

Attachment 5: HCID Laboratory POC Testing Protocol

Attachment 6: HCID Isolation Guide

**5. Resources**

5.1 Legal Authorities

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Statute** | **Agency** | **Authority** |
| Chapter 68. Title 42  | Federal Government  | Provides authority to declare and respond to emergencies and aid protect public health; implemented by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)  |
| Title 42 United States Code Section 264 (Section 361 of the Public Health Service [PHS] Act)  | FederalGovernmentCenters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) | Under its delegated authority, the CDC is empowered to detain, medically examine, or conditionally release individuals reasonably believed to be carrying a communicable disease. Influenza viruses that cause/ have potential to cause a pandemic are included in the list of quarantinable diseases.  |
| Chapter 252, Florida Statutes Emergency Management Act Section 381.003, F.S.  | Governor Florida Division of Emergency Management  | Allows Governor to declare a state of emergency Gives Governor and Division direction and control of emergency management Allows Governor and Division to delegate authority to carry out critical functions to protect the peace, health, safety, and property of the people of Florida  |
| Chapter 381, F.S. Section 381.0011, F.S. Communicable Disease and Quarantine Section 381.00315, F.S. Public Health Emergencies and Advisories  | Department of Health | Authorizes the department to administer and enforce laws and rules relating to control of communicable disease Authorizes the department to declare, enforce, modify, and abolish quarantine of persons, animals, and premises Authorizes the department to specify the conditions and procedures for imposing and releasing a quarantine Authorizes the State Health Officer to declare public health emergencies and issue public health advisories  |
| Section 381.0012, F.S. Enforcement Authority  | Department of Health  | Authorizes the department to maintain necessary legal action; request warrants for law enforcement assistance; and directs state and county attorney, law enforcement and city and county officials upon request to assist the department to enforce the state health laws and rules adopted under Chapter 381, F.S.  |
| Section 768.28, F.S. Sovereign Immunity for State Officers and Employees  | State Agencies  | Protects state employees who administer immunizations as part of their official duties  |
| Section 120.54, F.S.  | State Agencies  | Allows state agencies to adopt temporary emergency rules when there is immediate danger to public health, safety, or welfare without going through the normal rule making process  |

5.2 Additional Resources/References

State, interstate, and federal assistance resource support to local communities is expected to be limited or not available. Supply chains will become compromised and both staffing, and equipment will be in short supply. Sharing of information on how to stretch out resources is a CFDMC responsibility.

<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/mitigating-staff-shortages.html>

<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/ppe-strategy/strategies-optimize-ppe-shortages.html>

<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/using-ppe.html>

<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/respirators-strategy/index.html>

<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/ppe-strategy/face-masks.html>

<https://www.dhs.gov/publication/st-multicooker-decontamination-n95-respirators> (the State of Florida has purchased the Battel system to decontaminate N95s for reuse)

<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/ppe-strategy/gloves.html>

<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/ppe-strategy/burn-calculator.html>

<https://www.cms.gov/medicareprovider-enrollment-and-certificationsurveycertificationgeninfopolicy-and/guidance-use-certain-industrial-respirators-health-care-personnel>

<https://files.asprtracie.hhs.gov/documents/fema-mocc-toolkit.pdf>

<https://www.cms.gov/files/document/cms-non-emergent-elective-medical-recommendations.pdf>

<https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/optimizing-ventilator-use-during-covid19-pandemic.pdf>

<https://www.ems.gov/pdf/Strategy_to_Mitigate_EMS_Workforce_Absenteeism.pdf>

<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/guidance-for-ems.html>

<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/retirement/considerations.html>

<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/long-term-care.html?CDC_AA_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fcoronavirus%2F2019-ncov%2Fhcp%2Flong-term-care-strategies.html>

ASPR TRACIE Developed Resources (available at <https://asprtracie.hhs.gov/>)

Infectious Diseases

* Bioterrorism and High Consequence Biological Threats TC
* Coronaviruses (e.g., SARS, MERS and COVID-19) TC
* Ebola/VHF TC
* EMS Infectious Disease Playbook
* Healthcare Coalition Influenza Pandemic Checklist
* Hospital Personal Protective Equipment Planning Tool
* Infectious Disease Select Resources
* Influenza Epidemic/ Pandemic TC
* Novel Coronavirus Resources
* COVID-19 Regional Support Resources
* Rural Health and COVID-19 Quick Sheet
* Zika TC

Communications/Communication Systems

* Information Sharing
* Risk Communications/Emergency Public Information and Warning
* Social Media in Emergency Response

Crisis Standards of Care

* Ethics
* Fatality Management
* Healthcare-Related Disaster Legal/ Regulatory/ Federal Policy
* Hospital Patient Decontamination
* Hospital Surge Capacity and Immediate Bed Availability
* Mental/Behavioral Health (non-responders)
* Partnering with the Healthcare Supply Chain During Disasters
* Sample State Pandemic Plans

4.3 **Key Issues by Scenario Type**

This list supplements the considerations noted in **Section 2.4 Operational Mission Areas.**

Bioterrorism

* Recognition of event / determination of potential impact
* Defining the population at risk / implementing screening
* Environmental assessment
* Request for state/federal assets – PPE, ventilators, MCM / treatment, Federal Medical Station (FMS)
* State / federal declarations of disaster
* Risk communications
* Behavioral health (community and responders)
* Regional patient movement coordination / MOCC
* Surge capacity (outpatient and inpatient) with an emphasis on critical care
* Alternate care systems / sites
* Incorporation of SNS, FMS, and other federal resources into response
* MCM distribution – community
* MCM distribution and use – healthcare o Pharmacy (e.g., distribution, receipt, handling, billing)
* Clinical care (e.g., antitoxin)
* Crisis Standards of Care (CSC) – roles and responsibilities, triage decision-making
* Fatality management
* Waste management and environmental protection of facilities

VHF/Ebola

* Recognition of case(s) / determination of potential impact
* Identify – isolate – inform
* Testing / sample coordination
* Risk communications
* Behavioral health (community and responders)
* Regional patient movement coordination / MOCC role / thresholds (i.e., when is a MOCC needed?)
* PPE support / coordination
* Engineering and administrative controls for infection prevention
* Public health investigation / isolation / quarantine
* Frontline / Assessment / Regional treatment resources and roles o Surge capacity plan in event of multiple cases
* EMS transport mechanisms / teams / process
* Waste management and environmental protection of facilities
* Fatality Management

Highly Pathogenic Respiratory Viral Infection

* Recognition of case(s) / determination of potential impact
* Identify – isolate – inform
* Regional patient movement coordination / MOCC role / threshold (i.e., when is a MOCC needed?)
* Testing / sample collection
* Risk communication
* Behavioral health (community and responders)
* PPE support / coordination
* Public health investigation / isolation / quarantine
* Engineering and administrative controls for infection prevention
* Frontline / Assessment / Regional treatment resources and roles (may be significantly different than VHF; regional facilities may not be used; and usual referral centers may provide care) o Surge capacity plan in event of multiple cases
* EMS transport mechanisms / teams / process as applicable

Pandemic

* Recognition of case(s) / determination of potential impact
* Identify – isolate – inform
* Coalition vs. state coordination / interface (how do coalitions interface with state response to prevent duplication of effort / maintain coalition operations that may be different in different areas)
* Request for state/federal assets – PPE, ventilators, MCM / treatment, Federal Medical Station (FMS)
* State / federal declarations of disaster
* Regional patient movement coordination / MOCC role and ‘level loading’ policies
* Risk communications
* Behavioral health (community and responders)
* PPE use recommendations, support for fit-testing, supply / cache support role
* Supply Chain
* Public health investigation / isolation / quarantine
* Surge capacity (outpatient and inpatient, especially ICU)
* CSC – indicators and triggers (e.g., cancelling elective surgery), roles and responsibilities, triage decision-making
* Testing strategy and roles/responsibilities
* MCM distribution – community
* MCM distribution and use – healthcare
* Pharmacy (e.g., distribution, receipt, handling, billing)
* Clinical care
* Long-term care facility support
* Homecare agency support
* Alternate care sites / systems
* Fatality management